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The Sense of Agency and Its Role in Strategic Control for Expert
Mountain Bikers
Wayne Christensen, Kath Bicknell, Doris McIlwain, and John Sutton
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Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as
delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the
nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the
sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that
the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal
influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained differentiation of the contri-
butions of self and external factors to action outcomes. We further argue that the sense
of agency incorporates prospective awareness of actions that are possible in a situation
and awareness of the limits of control. These forms of sense of agency enable highly
flexible, context-sensitive strategic control, and are likely to contribute to high inter-
individual variability in responses to complex tasks.
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In July 2014 two of the authors, Kath and
Wayne, were riding at the Ourimbah moun-
tain bike track in the Central Coast region of
New South Wales, Australia. Kath is an ex-
perienced mountain bike rider, whereas
Wayne has very limited experience riding off-
road. The plan was that Kath would teach
Wayne some basic mountain bike riding tech-
niques. One of the sections of the Ourimbah
course that Wayne found challenging was a
rocky ascent with tight uphill turns. This re-
quired maneuvering up through the rocks and
around the corners at low speed, maintaining
balance and control while timing pedal
strokes to avoid crunching the pedals onto
rocks. This was a nervous process for Wayne
because he was not sure whether he could ride
the section. Like many novices he has diffi-
culty maintaining balance and control at slow
speeds. A point came where Wayne felt that
he had run out of options: he did not have
enough momentum to get around the next
rock or enough space to pedal. Anticipating
that he would come to a stop and fall over, he
unclipped and put his foot down, and then had
to walk the rest of the section. Behind him
Kath was ‘trackstanding’—staying balanced
while motionless. When he was clear, she
rode smoothly and easily up the path.
In this article we examine some important
relations between skill and the sense of
agency (SoA). We argue that not only does
skill improve action abilities, but it also im-
proves action awareness, which, in turn, fa-
cilitates action control. Unsurprisingly, Kath
possesses a much more highly developed ac-
tion repertoire for mountain biking compared
to Wayne. But Kath also exhibits a more
highly developed awareness of her actions
and abilities in relation to the situation, which
allows her to adjust to changing circum-
stances and employ flexible strategic control
to improve her performance.
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Researchers have devoted little attention to
the influence of skill on the SoA. Accounts of
skill that emphasize automaticity suggest that
highly skilled individuals will have minimal
awareness of their actions (e.g., Beilock &
Carr, 2001; Dreyfus, 2013; Brownstein,
2014). Recently, a number of authors have
argued against this view, claiming that self-
awareness can be enhanced in elite skills and
can contribute positively to performance
(e.g., Sutton, 2007; Montero, 2010; Sutton et
al., 2011; Fridland, 2014; Toner et al., 2014).
Contemporary accounts of the sense of
agency, such as comparator-based accounts
(Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2012), cue integra-
tion accounts (Synofzik et al., 2008; Moore &
Fletcher, 2012), and metacognitive accounts
(Carruthers, 2015), neither explicitly address
skill nor provide clear expectations for the
effect of skill improvement on the SoA. Nor
have researchers conducted much empirical
investigation of the SoA that considers the
role of skill. A notable exception is a study by
van der Wel et al. (2012), which found that
the SoA increased as performance on a novel
sensorimotor task improved.
Research on the SoA has typically focused on
abnormal cases, laboratory tasks probing basic
action awareness capacities, and phenomeno-
logical characterizations of everyday actions.
Unusual forms of action awareness, such as
delusions of alien control in schizophrenia
(Frith et al., 2000) and cases of illusory SoA in
normal individuals (Wegner, 2002) can reveal
breakdowns or distortions in the mechanisms of
action awareness. Experimental methods such
as probabilistic action-effect tasks have investi-
gated basic capacities to detect causal relations
between simple actions and simple events, such
as a button press and the sounding of a tone
(e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Philosophers on
the other hand, as well as drawing on scientific
evidence, have employed phenomenological
analyses of everyday action experience to char-
acterize the SoA. Gallagher (2000, 2012) and
Pacherie (2007, 2008), for example, have pre-
sented influential characterizations of the SoA
derived from pathological cases, experimental
research and phenomenological descriptions.
Each of these sources of evidence has
strengths and limitations. Pathological and illu-
sory cases reveal some of the limits of the SoA,
but provide only limited information about its
normal functioning among healthy individuals.
Probing basic capacities using artificial tasks in
the laboratory can address some aspects of nor-
mal functioning, but does little to cast light on
the functioning of the SoA in everyday situa-
tions that demand complex action control. Phe-
nomenological accounts can provide rich qual-
itative descriptions of the SoA in real-world
conditions, but lack the rigorous controls possi-
ble in the laboratory. Nevertheless, phenomeno-
logical accounts have an important role to play:
phenomenological descriptions of real-word ac-
tion can help in conceptualizing the ‘big pic-
ture,’ contributing to theory development and
rigorous controlled experimentation.
The phenomenological descriptions pro-
vided by philosophers who have commented
on action and the SoA typically concern fa-
miliar everyday actions like answering an e-
mail or responding to a knock on the door
(examples used by Gallagher, 2012). Yet to
gain a complete understanding of action con-
trol, it is necessary to consider advanced
skills that involve highly developed and re-
fined action control in real-world contexts.
Gallagher and Pacherie briefly discuss cases
that involve the SoA experienced by a skilled
tennis player (Pacherie, 2008, p. 210) and a
skilled climber (Gallagher, 2012, p. 29). But
because advanced (nonacademic) skills are
typically not part of the personal experience
of philosophers, producing detailed phenom-
enological accounts in these kinds of cases
requires collaboration with individuals who
possess such skills. This is our approach here.
We focus on competitive mountain biking,
which involves complex sensorimotor and stra-
tegic control at fast speeds. Our account centers
on a case study of Kath’s experiences preparing
for the final round of the Australian Gravity
Enduro Series in Cairns. Kath has been in-
volved in mountain biking for more than 15
years, giving her a perspective that combines a
theoretical approach to skilled action with ex-
tensive personal experience.1 Gravity Enduro is
a type of racing where most competitors only
see highly technical tracks a couple of times
1 Barbara Montero’s work is similarly informed by per-
sonal experience as a ballet dancer (e.g. Montero, 2010).
See McIlwain and Sutton (2015) for a methodological dis-
cussion of the value and challenges of research in which the
researcher is a practitioner.
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before racing against the clock (and each other).
Riders are forced to develop ways of remem-
bering and negotiating challenging and unfamil-
iar trail features within short time frames. These
demands raise interesting questions about the
processes involved in predicting, monitoring,
and adjusting performance in situations that
hold bone-breaking consequences for the poor
execution of judgment or technique. These chal-
lenges are, of course, part of the attraction of the
sport, which is growing in popularity.
We suggest that key elements of Kath’s ex-
perience hold the potential to elucidate the na-
ture and role of the SoA from a ‘big picture,’
qualitative perspective. We frame our discus-
sion in relation to Pacherie’s (2007, 2008) mul-
tilevel characterization of the SoA, which is
perhaps the most comprehensive to date, and
highlight similarities and differences between
our approaches.
Hierarchical Action Control and the Sense
of Agency
As a starting point, it is important to dis-
tinguish between long-term and occurrent
SoA: the former refers to the sense of oneself
as an agent over time, whereas the latter re-
fers to the sense of agency experienced during
action (Pacherie, 2007, p. 6). Occurrent SoA
is often conceptualized as the sense of being
the author of the action performed (Gallagher,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; Wegner, 2002;
Pacherie, 2007, 2008; Moore & Fletcher,
2012). Pacherie’s (2007, 2008) account fo-
cuses on occurrent SoA and on explaining
what she describes as immersed and nonre-
flective agency, which encompasses ‘how-
awareness’ and the ‘sense of control.’ How-
awareness is awareness of the specific manner
of performing an action (p. 198), whereas the
sense of control includes both feeling in con-
trol of an action and the sense of exerting
control of an action (p. 209). We will be
mainly referring to the former when we use
the term ‘sense of control.’
Pacherie’s (2007, 2008) account of the SoA
extends the comparator theory (Frith et al.,
2000), which is based on predictive models
thought to govern motor control (Wolpert &
Kawato, 1998). The central idea of the compar-
ator theory is that when the observed outcome
of an action matches the predicted outcome, the
movement is perceived as self-generated,
whereas when a mismatch occurs, the move-
ment is attributed to an external cause (Frith et
al., 2000). Pacherie extends this idea by postu-
lating a hierarchical model of action control that
involves three levels: ‘rational,’ ‘situational,’
and ‘motor’ control (2008, p. 210). Action con-
trol involves a top-down cascade, though not all
levels of control need be operative in every
action. Rational control involves forming over-
arching action plans, typically before the per-
formance of the action. Situational control in-
volves applying an action plan to the demands
of the immediate situation. Motor control in-
volves specifying motor programs based on sit-
uational control.
Although the content, format, and pro-
cesses of higher level control models are dif-
ferent from those involved in motor control,
Pacherie claims that the core structure of con-
trol, involving prediction-outcome compari-
son, is likely to be similar (Pacherie, 2008,
pp. 192–193). According to Pacherie (2008),
the sense of control at the level of rational
control is based on whether the action plan is
successfully carried out, whereas at the level
of situational control it is based on the match
between the predicted and actual conse-
quences of actions. Pacherie claims that mo-
tor control is automatic, and only contributes
to the experience of control when large pre-
diction-outcome discrepancies are present.
Pacherie explains how-awareness in terms of
the structure of the control hierarchy. Thus,
how-awareness of rational control concerns
the subgoals and subactions of the action
plan, the how-awareness of situational control
is awareness of movements of certain types,
and the how-awareness of motor control is
awareness of fully specified movements (p.
198).
Our account will support some aspects of
Pacherie’s theory and also suggest amendments
and additions. Although we endorse the claims
that (a) three levels of control play an important
role in the SoA, and (b) model-based control is
integral to the functioning of these levels of
control, we argue that the SoA incorporates
forms of awareness that Pacherie does not rec-
ognize and cannot be explained on the basis of
comparator processes postulated by the compar-
ator theory. We also address the contribution
that the SoA makes to action control. Pacherie
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notes that her account does not address this
contribution,2 but we contend that it is an im-
portant aspect of understanding the SoA. Fi-
nally, as noted earlier, we argue that skill learn-
ing enhances the senses of agency and control.
The Sense of Agency in Action
In October 2014 Kath rode down a section of
trail called ‘Croc’s Teeth’ at Smithfield Moun-
tain Bike Park in Cairns, Australia, for the final
round of the Australian Gravity Enduro Series.
She finished in fifth place in the Elite Female
category in the series overall and in fourth place
in this final round in Cairns. The bike and the
trail were new to Kath, and the trail was ‘tech-
nical,’ meaning that it required advanced riding
skills. In addition to competitive mountain bik-
ing and research, Kath also works as a cycling
journalist and equipment tester. This means that
she has experience with a broad range of bikes
and trails, and often rides new (test) bikes in
unfamiliar conditions. In what follows Kath re-
ports on her experiences based on her field
notes.
The Smithfield round of the Australian Grav-
ity Enduro Series took place over two days,
October 11 and 12, 2014. The event included
six timed ‘stages,’ or routes, which linked to-
gether signed twists and turns through the trop-
ical jungle. Croc’s Teeth was an obstacle that
was part of stages two and four. Over four days
and just under 10 hours of riding, Kath rode this
short section of trail five times. When she first
arrived at the obstacle, she got off the bike and
looked at the terrain. She observed different
pathways for riding through it, before remount-
ing her bike and attempting to ride a line that
went to the left before heading back toward the
middle of the obstacle. She was not successful
in cutting across from the left hand line on the
first attempt at the maneuver, put her foot down
to stop early, and walked her bike backup to the
slope to try again. On consultation with a friend
who was also practicing Croc’s Teeth, Kath
adjusted the point she aimed for part way
through the obstacle and was successful in rid-
ing it on the next attempt. On the third attempt,
a day later, she slowed down to glance at the
obstacle before rolling into it, but maintained
momentum on her bike the whole time. Her
goal this time was to ride it smoothly, with
increased speed. The fourth attempt, on day
three, took place an hour before racing com-
menced. Having ridden the other race stages by
now, which were far more technical, she felt
quite comfortable on Croc’s Teeth this time.
After practicing a more difficult track further up
the hill that morning, she took ‘race stage two’
to get back to the start line and used this final
run to relax and focus ahead of the race itself.
In the analysis that follows, we concentrate
primarily on the first successful attempt at
Croc’s Teeth, which involved a familiarization
process that illustrates key features of the SoA.
Kath’s initial adjustment to the bike and trail is
especially revealing with respect to core pro-
cesses of action control and awareness in this
kind of skill (see Figure 1).
Although Kath’s experience and background
knowledge informed her expectations about the
characteristics of the new bike she used in
Cairns, the performance of the bike could only
be properly ascertained by riding it. During her
first successful attempt at Croc’s Teeth, Kath’s
attention was consequently shared between
learning how to negotiate the trail and assessing
how the bike would respond. An issue of con-
cern was whether the brakes were sufficiently
worn in to provide strong stopping power. An-
other key issue was the responsiveness of the
suspension and whether it was properly tuned
for Kath’s body weight and riding style. If the
suspension was too stiff, it would feel jarring
over rough obstacles and make the bike harder
to control; too soft and it would bottom-out,
once again failing to soak up the bumps prop-
erly. The geometry of a bike also has a big
effect on its handling, making it twitchy or
stable, and affecting the way that the rider needs
to move to achieve the right body position dur-
ing steep descents and other complex maneu-
vers. Kath was able to quickly get a feel for the
bike. In about seven meters of trail she learned
that the brakes were powerful and set up well in
relation to her hands, the suspension was ‘but-
tery smooth’ (excellent), and the geometry gave
the bike stable handling and placed her in an
ideal body position with little effort. “In that
short run I learned enough about the feel and
2 She says, “Although this paper investigated the possible
sources of the phenomenology of agency, it said next to
nothing as to the possible causal role of awareness of action
or feelings of agency.” (2007, p. 24)
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handling of the bike that I confidently attacked
each new obstacle from then on,” she wrote
(Bicknell, in press, italics in original) in a book
chapter that examines this experience in more
depth.
Understanding the specific handling charac-
teristics of the bike allowed Kath to adjust her
approach to riding the later features of that
particular obstacle. As she continued to learn
about this bike and this terrain, she adjusted the
approach that she would use for the upcoming
trails; with improved understanding of the bike
she could attack them with more confidence,
speed, and precision. She knew that on this
particular bike she could ride more aggressively
rather than cautiously over difficult obstacles,
and that she would not damage the suspension
riding over a steep drop further down the track.
She could focus further ahead on obstacles
down the trail, rather than compensating for the
handling of the bike, as she would need to do,
for example, with a bike with less powerful
brakes.
Conceptualizing Complex Skilled Action
We now introduce some conceptualizations
of complex skilled action that allow us to iden-
tify key features of Kath’s experience at Croc’s
Teeth and illuminate the nature and role of the
sense of agency.
Complex Causality
The kind of skilled action that Kath was
engaged in exhibits complex causality and a
complex parametric structure. The outcome of
braking, for example, is influenced by many
factors, including features of the environment
like surface topography (e.g., rough, smooth,
steep, flat); surface type (e.g., loose sand, rock,
slippery tree roots); equipment features (e.g.,
tire type, tire pressure, quality and condition of
the brakes); and braking technique, dynamic
shifts of body position to distribute weight
evenly between front and rear tires, and in some
cases drive weight down through the tires, pro-
viding better grip.
Control Interventions in Complex Processes
The processes involved in this kind of skilled
action are temporally extended and show a high
degree of continuity, rather than having a dis-
crete action-outcome structure. Thus, applying
pressure to the brakes typically serves as a con-
trol influence on an unfolding process such as
adjusting speed to set up for an upcoming ob-
stacle. In this kind of skill, action control often
operates by adjusting one or more parameters in
order to influence other parameters. We will call
the first ‘control parameters’ and the second
‘target parameters.’ Applying pressure to the
brakes influences a control parameter in order to
change a target parameter—speed—which may
itself be serving as a control parameter for an-
other target parameter, such as a particular line
around a corner. The distinction between con-
trol and target parameters is thus relative, illus-
trating the importance of prospective awareness
in complex action sequences.
Causal Control Models
An ability to exert this kind of parametric
control is based on what we call a causal con-
trol model that captures causal relations among
performance parameters and allows the individ-
ual to flexibly and appropriately identify and
influence control and target parameters in a
particular situation. This allows the individual
to achieve key performance goals, such as
smooth riding and positioning for upcoming
obstacles.
High Order Control
The kind of complex skilled actions de-
scribed involve multiple levels of control. Kath
adopted a particular strategic approach during
Figure 1. Kath’s first successful ride down Croc’s Teeth.
Her body is weighted toward the back of the bike to relieve
pressure on the front suspension and indicating a slower,
less relaxed approach to the descent. Photo: Rosemary
Barnes.
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her initial ride down Croc’s Teeth. She could
have taken the section more quickly, trusting
that the bike would perform well, but this strat-
egy would increase the risk of crashing and,
potentially, forfeiting the race. Instead, she ad-
opted a cautious approach that involved riding
relatively slowly and learning more about the
bike and the trail. This strategy influenced her
proximal control of the bike and her pattern of
attention. As she gained information about the
bike, she modified her strategic approach and
her subsequent proximal control. Kath here was
engaging in what we call high order control,
which involves (a) sensitivity to the parametric
structure of the performance situation, (b) use of
this information for top-down adjustment of
proximal control, and (c) appropriate adjust-
ment of strategic control. Thus, information
about the characteristics of the bike’s suspen-
sion that she gained from feedback while riding
had an immediate influence on Kath’s proximal
bike control, but also affected her strategy for
later obstacles and overall riding approach. Her
approach to the obstacle gave her room to alter
her path or come to an early stop if performance
went awry, which is what happened in the first
attempt, and relied on an embodied ability to
make on-the-fly adjustments to technique (Sut-
ton et al., 2011; Christensen et al., in press).
Some Key Concepts for Understanding the
Sense of Agency
The preceding concepts provide a starting
point for understanding the kind of control in-
volved in the type of complex skilled action
described above. They also provide a basis for
identifying key features of the SoA and its role
in action control.
Parametric Causal Awareness
We define parametric causal awareness as
awareness of key causal parameters that affect
performance; for example, the compliance of
the suspension, the stopping power of the
brakes, the grip afforded by the tires and
ground, speed, and distance to the corner ahead.
Parametric causal awareness distinguishes con-
tributions of the equipment and environment
from personal contributions to an outcome, the
awareness of which allows the rider to adjust
her own control inputs as the parameters of the
environment and equipment change. An impor-
tant component of the SoA is thus awareness of
control acts in relation to the performance state,
such as awareness that the current braking pres-
sure is going to slow speed just enough to safely
take a fast line around a corner.
To be clear, we are not claiming that the
individual is aware of the full causal structure of
performance. To clarify our position it will help
to compare it with the common view that motor
control is largely automatic. For example, ac-
cording to this latter view, when reaching for a
coffee cup you may consciously decide to
reach, but the parametric details, including the
specific trajectory, the speed of the movement,
and the preparatory adjustments of the hand to
grip the cup, are all determined by automatic
processes (see, e.g., Frith et al., 2000, p. 1773).
Accordingly, higher level action control gener-
ally consists in selecting coarsely specified ac-
tions, like ‘pick up the cup,’ leaving parametric
details to automatic motor control processes.
This view is held by Pacherie (2008), for in-
stance. We do not deny that many automatic
motor control processes occur outside aware-
ness, but we reject the idea that people lack
parametric awareness or control of actions at
higher levels of control.
To appreciate why parametric awareness and
control might be required at higher levels of
action control it is helpful to consider the sig-
nificance of the variability of key performance
parameters. For example, if most of the param-
eters that affect braking in mountain biking
were fixed or predictable, then they could be
almost entirely ignored: a simple relation would
exist between pressure on the brake levers and
speed reduction, which could be learned by the
predictive models described by Wolpert’s inter-
nal models theory (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998).
But the parameters that affect braking are highly
variable, and a given amount of pressure on the
brake levers could have widely varying out-
comes.
Wolpert’s theory explains context-sensitive
adjustments of action in terms of the selection
of contextually appropriate internal models
based on perceptual cues. For example, differ-
ent internal models might govern the action of
picking up an object depending on whether it is
perceived as heavy or light. But we doubt that
this type of control is sufficiently flexible to
fully cope with the variability of parameters that
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influences actions like braking in mountain bik-
ing. The context-sensitivity provided by the in-
ternal models account is stereotypic, and it re-
lies on stable, prelearned perceptual cues to
trigger appropriate internal models.
In this respect it is useful to contrast the kind
of models described by Wolpert’s (Wolpert &
Kawato, 1998) motor control theory with the
causal control models we described earlier.
Causal control models incorporate explicit rep-
resentations of causal relations, whereas the
predictive models of Wolpert’s theory do not.
Accordingly, causal control models are not de-
pendent on prelearned perceptual cues, and this
allows a situation-specific control model to be
constructed based on the causal factors in the
situation, facilitating effective control in new
and idiosyncratic conditions. Causal control
models are at least partly accessible to aware-
ness and participate in high order control, which
thereby affords responsivity to a wide range of
information and allows for the rapid adjustment
of control at multiple levels in response to vari-
ation in any causally significant parameter that
is represented in the model. These characteris-
tics allow for much greater flexibility of re-
sponse than the internal models theory can ac-
count for.
One of the benefits of parametric causal
awareness is that it supports flexible attention
and diagnosis. For example, part way through a
difficult rocky descent, a rider might find herself
taking a poor line and moving too slowly. Her
slow speed forces her to take a path around an
obstacle rather than launching over it, because
extra speed is needed to land safely on the other
side. She may in turn realize that her disadvan-
tageous situation during the descent is the result
of overly cautious braking, or a poor line choice
at the start of the descent. Thus, identifying the
source of an immediate problem may involve
tracing back from current performance state to
control acts that are causally and temporally at
a significant distance. Importantly, if individu-
als were not differentially aware of the contri-
butions of their own control acts to performance
state this kind of diagnosis would not be possi-
ble.
At any given point many of the causal rela-
tions that are or can be part of the causal control
model will be in the background or outside of
awareness, with attention focused on causal pa-
rameters that are immediately relevant to con-
trol. Once Kath became accustomed to the stop-
ping power of the brakes on the new bike, for
example, she no longer needed to focus on the
brakes per se. Nevertheless, attention can flex-
ibly shift to previously unattended causal rela-
tions as they become relevant.
Situation Awareness
Parametric causal awareness is part of sit-
uation awareness, which is an integrated ho-
listic understanding of the situation as it re-
lates to the control problems of performance
(Endsley, 2006). Earlier we suggested that it
is unlikely that the motor-outcome mappings
involved in actions like braking in mountain
biking can rely entirely on stereotypic inter-
nal models cued by perceptual features of the
situation. Situation awareness, with integral
parametric causal awareness, provides a layer
of interpretation and adjustment, which
means that control need not rely entirely on
stereotypic models and prelearned perceptual
cues, though such structures undoubtedly do
contribute to control. Situation awareness in-
forms the causal control model and provides
the basis for high order control, which yields
a fluid interplay between parameters of im-
mediate control (e.g., a slippery tree root
across the trail ahead) and strategic control,
such as an approach to navigating the tree
root. Good situation awareness is crucial to
elite mountain biking, with competitors need-
ing to adjust their approach in relation to a
multitude of factors. For instance changes in
the weather, deterioration of the track after
many tires have passed over it, and fatigue
can all greatly affect performance.
Prospective Sense of Agency
In our view the SoA also includes prospective
awareness of potential control acts that can in-
fluence the performance state. When Wayne
unclipped and put his foot down at the Ourim-
bah track, his subjective sense was that there
was no action he could take that would allow
him to keep riding. To avoid falling off he had
to stop completely. Conversely, a positive pro-
spective SoA involves awareness of the control
acts that can achieve various desirable out-
comes. If Wayne were able to pause and track-
stand the bike, he may have been able to repo-
sition his foot to provide a more powerful pedal
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stroke—one that would see him accelerate over
the rock without hitting his pedal on the way.
Pausing earlier may alternatively have allowed
him to readjust his line choice. Prospective SoA
might include awareness of both possibilities
and awareness that either outcome will be sat-
isfactory.
Prospective Sense of Control
We also contend that the sense of control
involves prospective awareness. To character-
ize this we employ the concept of a perfor-
mance envelope, borrowed from aviation
(Sinclair, 2005), which specifies the range of
performance states that are possible or opti-
mal. The performance envelope is readily il-
lustrated for cornering: speed and line
through a corner are interdependent, with
higher speeds requiring a wider exit line, un-
less the rider can perform an advanced ma-
neuver, such as flicking or drifting the wheels
and altering the direction of the bike part way
through. If the speed is too high, it may be
impossible to get around the corner without
running off the track or losing traction in an
uncontrolled fashion. In our view the sense of
control includes awareness of the relation of
the performance state to the performance en-
velope. Control is secure when the current
performance state is comfortably within the
performance envelope, and is insecure near
the edges. When Wayne feels insecure ma-
neuvering at very low speeds, it is partly
because it is harder for him to maintain bal-
ance; that is, he is near the edge of his per-
formance envelope.3
Performance confidence can also involve a
more generalized sense that the individual’s ac-
tion capabilities will be adequate for the chal-
lenges that the task is likely to present. Overall
confidence will in turn affectively tinge the
more immediate sense of agency involved in
specific actions.
Reflective Strategic Awareness
Situation awareness incorporates reflective
awareness of the significance of the immediate
situation for the strategic approach to the per-
formance and longer-term goals and strategies.
Kath’s strategy on her first ride down Croc’s
Teeth was in part shaped to her larger strategy
for the race; by taking a cautious approach to
her first attempt at the obstacle she reduced the
risk of a crash or equipment damage that would
increase prerace stress and might lead to injury.
As she gained confidence on the bike this dan-
ger was diminished, and she adjusted her riding
strategy accordingly.
Reflective Epistemic Awareness
Highly skilled individuals can also have a
finely tuned awareness of limitations in their
situation awareness, including limitations in
their senses of agency and control, in relation to
the demands of the situation. This awareness
can prompt adjustments in strategy and actions
designed to enhance awareness. Kath’s riding
approach to Croc’s Teeth exemplifies this pro-
cess. The speed and line choice with which
Kath entered Croc’s Teeth on each attempt, for
example, was not selected purely for moving
over the first part of the obstacle, but for how it
would influence her senses of agency and con-
trol for further riding.
Revisiting Croc’s Teeth
We now combine these concepts to show
how they illuminate Kath’s first successful ride
down Croc’s Teeth. Reflective strategic aware-
ness is one of the most salient features of Kath’s
experience. Kath realized that her limited un-
derstanding of the new bike could result in a
crash, which might damage the bike and possi-
bly injure herself, and which would affect her
confidence and ability to compete in the race.
Lack of familiarity with the bike and the track
also meant that she did not have the information
needed to ride the track at race pace. As Kath’s
understanding of the bike improved, she ad-
justed her strategy accordingly. Kath’s reflec-
tive strategic awareness incorporated reflective
epistemic awareness—she understood that she
did not yet have the information she needed for
good control, and her initial riding strategy re-
volved around acquiring this information.
One of Kath’s initial aims was to ‘get a feel
for the bike.’ In terms of the concepts we have
3 A further point to note is that the prospective senses of
agency and control have a strong interdependence. What
actions are available depends in part on the relation of the
performance state to the performance envelope, and the
relation of the performance state to the performance enve-
lope depends in part on what actions are available.
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presented, she was ‘parameterizing’ or calibrat-
ing her causal control model by discovering the
parametric characteristics of the bike (e.g.,
brake stopping power, handling characteristics;
see Figure 2). The calibration of Kath’s causal
control model provided more developed pro-
spective senses of agency and control; she had a
much better sense of the performance envelope
of the bike and what she could do riding it. This
knowledge led to immediate adjustments in
proximal and strategic control. She rode more
aggressively and focused further ahead, ap-
proaching obstacles in ways that reflected the
capacities of the bike and her own abilities on
board. This fluid interplay between strategic and
proximal control exemplifies high order control.
High order control continued to play a role in
subsequent riding, but with changing objec-
tives. Confidence in the bike, and her abilities
on board, allowed Kath to focus on other ele-
ments of the performance process. When she
returned to Croc’s Teeth a second time, almost
24 hours later, the risks stemming from a lack of
familiarity with the bike and the terrain were
reduced, and her focus shifted to riding a
smoother, straighter line through the obstacle.
She was now preparing to race the same track
the next day, pushing her skillset, encompassing
what she now knew about the capabilities of the
bike, at a faster speed. With limited time avail-
able for practice she was not aiming at perfec-
tion, but recalibrating a skilled repertoire to a
specific bike and trail in a way that was ‘good
enough’ for traversing it at a higher speed dur-
ing the race itself.4
It bears emphasis that the flexibility of high
order control will give rise to substantial vari-
ability among individuals. Factors such as per-
sonality, attitude, and emotion influence actions
and attentional focus (McIlwain, 2006). Thus,
other riders may have approached a situation
like Croc’s Teeth in a manner very different
from the approach that Kath adopted (e.g.,
faster initial speed, or greater concern with
identifying an optimal race line).
The Relation Between Skill and the Sense
of Agency
One of the key issues that our account ad-
dresses is the contribution of the SoA to action
control. Specifically, we contend that the SoA
and sense of control contribute to high order
control, which provides flexibility—the ability
to adapt rapidly to complex situations, fluidly
adjusting proximal and strategic control—that
is required for complex skills like mountain
biking. High order control provides a starting
point for addressing the basic question we be-
gan with, namely the relation between skill and
sense of agency. Because the SoA contributes
positively to skilled action control, we can rea-
sonably expect that skill learning will enhance
SoA for the kinds of actions performed as part
of the skill.
4 For further discussion of the phenomenological process
of incorporating new skills into an embodied action schema,
see Bicknell (2010). For examples of rapid adjustment to an
action plan during competition (in response to spectator
encouragement), see Bicknell (2011).
Figure 2. Attacking Croc’s Teeth during the second day of
the race. Kath’s body position is more aggressive. Her
weight is further forward over the front wheel and her focus
is fixed firmly ahead. Extra protective gear is worn in
anticipation of more difficult trails ahead. Photo: Reilly
Hurst.
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One of the most basic ways that skill learning
will enhance the sense of agency is through
improved sensitivity to key parameters. Based
on Kath’s instructions and feedback, and
Wayne’s interpretation of his experiences,
Wayne’s ride at Ourimbah left him with a much
clearer realization of the importance of low-
speed bike control and a better understanding of
the importance of balance, pedal placement,
line choice, and entry speed in such circum-
stances. In subsequent riding he has attempted
to improve his awareness of these parameters.
Improved parametric awareness should in turn
help in constructing causal control models and
the awareness of the contingencies of the per-
formance envelope. Among other benefits, in-
creased awareness will improve the localization
of sources of success and error, which will
improve the focus of subsequent learning
(Christensen & Hooker, 2000).
An important question, however, is whether
high order control continues to play a critical
role at the most advanced skill levels. Accord-
ing to influential theories of skill learning, con-
trol becomes largely automatic in the final
stages of skill acquisition (Fitts & Posner, 1967;
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). In our view this is
not generally the case (Christensen et al., in
press), and reports from elite athletes reveal the
kind of multifactorial, higher order, reflective
awareness that we have described in Kath’s
experience (see also Bicknell, 2013). Indeed,
the parametric awareness of performers at the
highest levels can be remarkably precise. After
his seeding run for the 2013 UCI Downhill
Mountain Bike World Championships,5 Jared
Graves increased his front and rear tire pressure
by 1 psi “as they were still a bit squirmy on a
couple very high speed G-outs.”6 This would
make his tires handle the transition in and out of
these trail features in a more controlled fash-
ion—the casing on his tires would deform less
(reducing the squirming sensation), thereby de-
creasing the probability of a puncture. This ad-
justment involves his observing equipment
function during the practice run, on more than
one obstacle, and in anticipation of the track
conditions and speed he would carry in his
competition run (Graves, 2013). Graves went
on to win the bronze medal. Rosemary Barnes,
the series winner of the Elite Women’s Austra-
lian Gravity Enduro Mountain Bike Series, re-
ported choosing a (more protective) full-face
helmet for a recent Gravity Enduro race because
of its influence on her emotional state (Rocky
Trail Entertainment, 2014). Rebecca Henderson
(2013) reports on a race in which hunger, me-
chanical problems, crashes, and fatigue from a
long race season consistently disrupts her per-
formance plan. She observes the positions of
her competitors and knows that one particular
girl is likely to finish in second place, which
means that Henderson needs to finish fourth or
higher to secure the overall UCI Under 23
Cross-Country Mountain Bike World Cup se-
ries title. Henderson finds opportunities to take
additional drink and a caffeinated energy gel,
she adapts her riding style to descend through a
rock garden with a flat rear tire, notes when she
has taken a bad line and is headed for a serious
crash, and draws on high levels of motivation to
overcome pain. She succeeded in finishing
fourth, and consequently won the title. This
performance shows considerable awareness,
flexibility, adjustment, and emotion control.
A further question is whether substantial dif-
ferences in high-order control and SoA are ev-
ident across diverse elite and everyday skills.
Our expectation is that numerous specific dif-
ferences will be apparent, but the core structure
of high-order control will, nevertheless, be pres-
ent in most skills. Montero (2010) argues that in
elite skills individuals typically strive for con-
tinual improvement, and they may need to in-
novate to succeed in high stakes performances.
Conversely, she suggests that in the case of
artistic skills, rote performances are dull and
tend toward stereotypes. She also points out that
attention is needed for online corrections. We
agree with all these points, and further suggest
that nonstereotypic performance can be vital
even for nonartistic skills because it allows fine-
grained sensitivity to situational nuances. How-
ever, we also believe that parametric awareness
and high-order control are important in every-
day skills. Even the skill of walking involves
surprisingly rich and subtle parametric sensitiv-
5 UCI stands for “Union Cycliste Internationale.” This
organization is the international governing body for cycling.
6 By G-out, or gravity-out, Graves is referring to the
impact of gravity on motion during changes of direction,
such as during very fast transitions from a downward slope
to a flat road or upward slope. Trail features that have this
effect are described as G-outs because of the way they are
experienced when ridden.
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ities to the shape or texture of the surface we are
walking on, obstacles in our path, or the prop-
erties of the shoes we are wearing.
Relation of Our Account to
Pacherie’s Theory
These case studies, and our conceptualization
of them, are supportive of and build on some of
the key features of Pacherie’s hierarchical model
of the SoA. In particular, our account reinforces
the importance of multilevel control for under-
standing the SoA, and supports Pacherie’s con-
ception of multilevel control as involving rational
(which we call strategic) situational and motor
control. Nevertheless, we depart from Pacherie in
some of the ways that we characterize the SoA
and the sense of control.
A basic feature of Pacherie’s account is that it
addresses occurrent SoA, which is understood as
distinct from long-term SoA. More specifically,
she aims to explain immersed, nonreflective SoA.
According to our account, however, occurrent
SoA incorporates multiple kinds of reflective
awareness, including reflective strategic and epis-
temic awareness. The prospective senses of
agency and control also incorporate reflectivity in
terms of evaluation of current performance state.
Moreover, one of the functions of reflective stra-
tegic awareness is to integrate long-term with im-
mediate agency. Another key difference between
Pacherie’s account and ours is that Pacherie uses
the comparator model to explain the sense of
control. However, comparator processes cannot
explain the prospective sense of control, which
must involve more complex forms of predictive
evaluation.
According to Pacherie’s account, ‘how-
awareness’ consists of awareness of the means
of performance at each level of control. Broadly
interpreted this should incorporate the paramet-
ric causal awareness we have described, but
Pacherie’s account does not recognize this kind
of awareness explicitly. Our emphasis on the
role of causal representation in the sense of
agency has notable similarities to Wegner’s
(2002) approach, but unlike Wegner we do not
believe that the SoA is systematically mislead-
ing. On the contrary, we contend that it is often
accurate, and that complex skilled action de-
pends on this accuracy. Other recent research
has also linked the sense of agency to causal
representation, including Buehner (2015) and
Desantis et al. (2011).
Pacherie also claims that there is little paramet-
ric awareness of motor control, but as we argued
earlier, we believe this is incorrect. Motor acts that
are calibrated precisely in relation to complex
situations are essential for skilled sensorimotor
control—a mountain bike rider needs to exert just
enough brake pressure to wash off enough speed
to make the corner without slowing too much. We
have claimed that this calibration is at least partly
performed by high order control.
Pacherie’s view that the SoA involves little
motor awareness is in keeping with the general
belief that motor control is automatic, but she
also appeals to experiments by Fourneret and
Jeannerod (1998). In these experiments partici-
pants moved a stylus on a tablet to draw a line
to a target. They were seated and looked toward
the tablet and their hand, but a mirror was
positioned above their arm which prevented
them from seeing their arm movements. A com-
puter-generated display projected onto the mir-
ror showed the line being drawn and the target.
On some trials perturbations were introduced so
that the hand had to move at a divergent angle
to draw a straight line to the target. The key
finding was that participants were unaware of
such divergences unless the discrepancy was
quite large.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that findings
from this experiment warrant the conclusion that
motor awareness is generally poor. Consistent
with cue integration theory (Synofzik et al., 2008;
Moore & Fletcher, 2012), we expect that motor
awareness flexibly exploits diverse kinds of per-
ceptual information, including visual information.
In many kinds of manipulation tasks, including
normal drawing, visual perception is a rich source
of information concerning hand and arm move-
ments. Participants were deprived of this informa-
tion, making the task quite unusual.7 They also
were not provided with feedback regarding dis-
crepancies. With the provision of such feedback
and extended practice, they might learn to detect
the perturbations. For comparison, Wayne cur-
rently has relatively poor balance awareness in
7 See Christensen et al. (2015) and Christensen et al. (in
press) for discussion of problems with drawing general
conclusions about action control on the basis of ecologically
unrealistic tasks.
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bike control, which manifests in poor balance at
low speed and difficulty trackstanding, because
poor body positioning results in instability. How-
ever, the feedback acquired through practice is
helping Wayne improve his balance awareness.
Bodily awareness is structured by the demands of
control and can change and develop through learn-
ing.
Conclusion
Our overarching concern in this article has
been with developing an understanding of the
SoA that clarifies its nature and role in com-
plex real-world actions. We claim that it is
important that theories of action and the SoA
be informed by detailed evidence concerning
the phenomena as they occur in the real
world. We have drawn on a brief comparison
between Kath and Wayne’s differing ap-
proaches to an uphill, rocky corner, together
with a more detailed description of Kath’s
experiences at a high-level mountain bike
competition, as a starting point for investiga-
tion. These experiences and approaches sug-
gest differences in capacity for prospective
awareness between an expert and a novice
rider, and provide insights into the perfor-
mance processes exhibited by an expert rider
adapting to novel circumstances.
Our account requires further validation,
and two strands of investigation stand out as
particularly important. The first is systematic
cognitive ethnographic research, which would
examine the SoA among a broad range of
experts at different skill levels in varied cir-
cumstances. The second is experimental in-
vestigation of awareness of the parameters of
actions that have complex causal structure,
and the role that such sensitivity may play in
action control. We suggest that parametric
awareness should develop in tandem with in-
creasing skill level.
Finally, our account has implications for
practical interventions to improve action control
and decision-making. We suggest that training
methods that enhance parametric sensitivity and
prospective action awareness may improve the
capacity to adjust to complex situations, engage
in on-the-fly strategic decision-making, and
trouble-shoot problems. This perspective might
offer fresh insights and approaches to action in
skill domains that seem, at first, like they have
very little to do with rock gardens, crocodile
teeth, or helping a friend to reach the top of a
hill.
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